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 CEO COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN: 
EVIDENCE FROM NEW PANEL DATA ON INDIVIDUAL CEO PAY 
 
I. Introduction 
CEO compensation of U.S. corporations has been studied extensively in the last two 
decades.1  In contrast, few attempts have been made to study CEO compensation of 
Japanese firms.2  Unlike in the U.S., Japanese firms have not been required to disclose 
information on compensation for any individual executives, and hence compensation data on 
individual executives of Japanese corporations have not been available for researchers.  The 
lack of such individual compensation data has been forcing researchers to tap into an 
alternative aggregate data source.   
Though not required to report salary and bonus of CEOs, Japanese corporations are 
required to report total salary and bonus earned by all directors, and such aggregate executive 
compensation data are readily available annually over an extended period of time.3  Prior 
studies often use a directory of corporate executives (such as Yakuin Shikiho) to obtain the 
total number of directors for each publicly traded firm in Japan and calculate the average 
director’s pay by dividing the total salary and bonus of all directors by the total number of 
directors.4  The data are, however, subject to usual aggregation bias: changes in the 
composition of the board will affect the salary and bonus earned by all directors.  In addition, 
they are subject to rather substantial underreporting of the salary and bonus earned by the 
average full-time director.  
First, in Japanese publicly held corporations, the heads (typically called "Bucho") of 
                                                        
1 A number of excellent surveys on this literature are available.  See, for example, Murphy (1999) for 
the mostly empirical literature and Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for the largely theoretical literature.  For an 
authoritative survey of earlier work, see Rosen (1990) who concludes his survey by urging scholars to broaden 
their inquiry beyond the U.S. to other countries, in particular Japan.   
2 Japanese CEOs (Shacho or Todori in the case of banks) are typically the most powerful and 
highest-ranking member of the board of directors although occasionally retired CEOs continue to have strong 
influence on the board as Kaicho.  We do not have individual compensation data on Kaicho.     
3 Nikkei NEEDS database is perhaps the most convenient way to get these panel data. 
4 See, for instance, Kaplan (1994), Xu (1997), Ang and Constand (1997), Joh (1999) and Kubo (2001).  
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major functional departments such as marketing, accounting, and personnel, are often 
appointed as directors.  Nonetheless, a large fraction of their salary is paid as wage 
payments for employees and is not reported as the salary and bonus of all directors in 
corporate proxy statements.  According to the Survey on Executive Compensation, Reward, 
and Pensions conducted in 1988 by Romu Gyosei Kenkyu Jo (Human Resource Management 
Research Institute), for those directors who are also the heads of departments, on average, 
only one third of the total compensation is reported as executive compensation in corporate 
proxy statements and the remaining two thirds are paid as "wage payment".  Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyu Jo (1988: 16) estimates that the inclusion of such "wage payment" will increase the 
average salary and bonus of all directors by more than 20%. 
Second, the total salary and bonus data reported in corporate proxy statements include 
part-time directors.  According to the Survey on Executive Compensation, Reward, and 
Pensions, the average part-time director earns about one quarter of what their full-time 
counterparts earn (see, Romu Gyosei Kenkyu Jo, 1988: 14).  Moreover, the same survey 
shows that more than 80% of firms with 1,000 or more employees have such part-time 
directors and among those firms with part-time directors, the average board of directors 
includes 2.5 part-time directors.  Since the same survey reports that the average board 
includes 19.2 full-time directors, the part-time directorship is hardly negligible.  The 
inclusion of those part-time directors will significantly lower the average salary and bonus of 
all directors.5 
This paper fills an important gap in the literature by providing the first econometric 
evidence on the performance sensitivity of Japanese CEO’s cash compensation, using unique 
panel data on individual CEO compensation of Japanese firms.  In so doing, the paper 
                                                        
5 See Kato (1997) for more details.  Kato and Rockel (1992a) collected individual tax returns of 
CEOs of 599 leading corporations in Japan and estimated each CEO’s taxable income.  They then estimated 
pay-performance sensitivities cross-sectionally.  Unfortunately, the cross-sectional nature of the data did not 
allow for standard fixed effect estimates.   
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contributes to one of the most important recent public-policy debates in Japan, or corporate 
governance reform.6   
The proponents of such reform argue that Japanese corporate governance is not 
sufficiently oriented towards shareholders and recommend changes that will bring Japanese 
corporate governance more in line with the Anglo-American model.  In fact, some of their 
recommendations have been already implemented.7  Unfortunately, however, existing 
evidence on the nature of managerial incentives in Japanese firms is limited and mixed.  In 
particular, there is no systematic study to investigate the performance sensitivity of Japanese 
CEO compensation using panel data on individual CEO compensation.  Even those studies 
using aggregate data tend to report mixed evidence (Kubo, 2001; 6).  The present study 
provides the first systematic evidence on the performance sensitivity of Japanese CEO 
compensation and thus offers important information currently missing in the debate.   
Specifically, we find consistently for all specifications that Japanese CEO’s cash 
compensation is indeed sensitive to firm performance (especially accounting measures as 
opposed to stock market measures), and that the sensitivity of CEO’s cash compensation to 
ROA (Return On Asset) is 1.3 to 1.4, which is in general agreement with prior estimates 
elsewhere.  Our estimates do not support that Japanese corporate governance is unusually 
defunct with regard to the significance and size of the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
accounting profitability.8  On the other hand, we do find that stock market performance 
tends to play a less important role in the determination of Japanese CEO compensation, 
which is largely consistent with the literature on Japanese corporate governance that tends to 
downplay the role of shareholders and stress the interests of banks and employees.  Finally, 
                                                        
6 See, for example, Ahmadjian (2001) for the debate on corporate governance reform in Japan. 
7 Stock options have been legalized in 1997 in Japan and since then they have been spreading rather 
rapidly.  See, for instance, Nagaoka (2002) for the recent diffusion of stock options among Japanese firms. 
8 In addition, prior studies provide evidence for executive turnover as a significant incentive 
mechanism to make Japanese executives responsive to firm performance.  See, for example, Kaplan and 
Minton (1994), Abe (1997), and Morck and Nakamura (1999). 
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we find that the bonus system makes CEO compensation more sensitive to firm performance 
in Japan.  The finding is in contrast to the literature on compensation for regular employees 
in Japan which often argues that bonus is a disguised base wage. 
In the next section we begin with background information on Japanese CEOs and 
corporate governance, and then introduce the data and describe our empirical strategy in 
Section III.  The results are presented in Section IV, followed by a concluding section.  
 
II. Japanese CEOs and Corporate Governance 
Kato and Rockel (1992b) assembled for the first time a large cross-national micro data 
set, containing information on CEOs of the 1000 most valuable (measured by market equity 
value) firms in Japan as well as information on CEOs of the 1000 most valuable firms in the 
U.S.  They find that over 60 percent of Japanese CEOs had 15 or more years of tenure at 
appointment to CEO rank and that the average Japanese CEO joined the company at age 29, 
spent 27 years in the company, and was promoted to CEO rank at age 56.  For the U.S., they 
discover that close to 50 percent of CEOs had 15 or more years of tenure at appointment to 
CEO rank and that the average CEO joined the firm at age 29, spent 20 years in the firm, and 
was promoted to CEO rank at age 49.  As such, the internal labor market for managers is 
quite well developed in both nations but it appears to play a more important role in the 
selection of CEOs in Japan than in the U.S.   
In terms of educational credentials, Kato and Rockel (1992b) report that as expected, 
nearly all CEOs (95 percent for Japan and 97 percent for the U.S.) hold college degrees.  
The highest proportion (close to 30 percent) of Japanese CEOs earned their degrees from the 
University of Tokyo and the most common major was economics and business (36 percent of 
Japanese CEOs majored in these subjects).  The highest proportion (a little over 10 percent) 
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of U.S. CEOs received their highest degrees from Harvard and one in five earned the degree 
of M.B.A. 
In spite of a popular belief of "underpaid" Japanese CEOs (or "overpaid" U.S. CEOs), 
there are only a few estimates on the level of Japanese CEO compensation.  Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyu Jo (1984) uses responses of 38 Japanese firms with 10 billion yen or more paid-in 
capital to a survey conducted by Chingin Kanri Kenkyu Jo (Wage Management Research 
Institute), and reports that the mean salary and bonus of CEOs in 1983 is 41 millions of yen 
(roughly 122 thousand dollars).  A more recent estimate is reported by Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyu Jo (1988).  Using responses of 45 Japanese firms with 1,000 or more employees to 
a survey conducted by Romu Gyosei Kenkyu Jo, they estimate the mean salary and bonus of 
CEOs in 1988 to be 35 millions of yen (roughly 276 thousand dollars).   The estimate based 
on the largest number of firms (599 publicly-traded firms in Japan) is provided by Kato and 
Rockel (1992a).  They use individual income tax returns of each CEO of these 599 firms, 
and report that the average taxable income of these CEOs in 1985 is about 44 millions of yen 
(roughly 220,000 dollars). 
Institutional information on who sets CEO compensation and how it is set is relatively 
scarce.9  The literature suggests that like in the U.S., initial recommendations for director’s 
pay levels (including CEO’s) typically originate from the firm’s management team.10  In 
large U.S. corporations, however, such recommendations will need to be approved by the 
firm’s compensation committee consisting of two or more “outside” directors.  Though such 
compensation committees are not completely free from CEO influence, they are not entirely 
entrenched and do function as a somewhat effective corporate governance mechanism in the 
U.S. (Murphy, 1999)  Such compensation committees are not typically used in Japan.  
                                                        
9 For such institutional information, see, for example, Murphy (1999) for the U.S. and Matsumoto 
(1991), Fukao (1995), and Kubo (2001) for Japan.  
10 While recommendations in the U.S. are for actual pay levels, those in Japan are for the maximum 
pay levels and typically the actual pay levels are less than the maximum levels (Kubo, 2001). 
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Instead, recommendations for director’s pay levels (that are typically proposed by directors 
themselves) are usually rubber-stamped by the annual general meetings of shareholders 
(Kubo, 2001).  As a result, it is often hypothesized that the sensitivity of CEO compensation 
to firm performance, in particular stock market performance, is weak in Japan.   
In addition, the literature on Japanese corporate governance tends to suggest that the 
market for corporate control, or the takeover disciplines may not be an effective mechanism 
for monitoring and controlling the behavior of CEOs and other senior directors in Japan.11  
First, the board of directors of Japanese corporations "functions as a de facto substructure of 
the management system subordinate to the representative (and permanent) directors (Aoki, 
1988: 142-149)."  Second, as discussed above, the annual general meetings of shareholders 
tend to be a mere formality.  Finally, takeovers in Japan are likely to entail prohibitively 
high cost of internal reorganizations of the Japanese company with well developed internal 
labor markets, resulting in making takeovers an empty threat.   
The literature then often points to the main bank as a more effective alternative 
corporate governance mechanism in Japan.  Specifically, the main bank as the principal 
lender gather and analyze vital information on its member firms (of which it is the principal 
lender) regularly and send its representatives to their boards when necessary. 
In short, the interests of shareholders are somewhat diluted in the Japanese corporate 
governance system as a result of the strong presence of the interests of other constituencies 
(e.g., debtholders and employees) in the Japanese corporate governance system.  The diluted 
interests of shareholders in the Japanese corporate governance imply that the sensitivity of 
CEO pay to firm performance, in particular stock market performance, may be weakened in 
Japan.           
 
                                                        
11 See for example Aoki (1988), Sheard (1989), Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein (1990 and 1991), Kaplan 
and Minton (1994), Montalvo and Yafeh (1994), Aoki and Patrick (1994), Weinstein and Yafeh (1995, 1998), 
Kato (1997), and Morck and Nakamura (1999). 
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III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
A major compensation consulting firm provided us with a 10-year panel data on 
salary and bonus of CEOs of 51 Japanese firms (18 listed and 33 unlisted firms) from 
1986-1995.  The data were from a private survey of CEO compensation conducted annually 
between 1986 and 1995 by the consulting firm.12  The industrial makeup of the sample of 51 
firms is 48% manufacturing; 21% retail and wholesale trade; 12% services; 8% construction; 
and the rest are equally split between Transportation/communication (6%) and 
finance/insurance (6%).  The Establishment and Enterprise Census conducted since 1947 by 
Japan Statistical Bureau provide the industrial makeup of the population of all firms in 
Japan.13  The corresponding figures for the population of all firms in Japan in 1996 were 
20% manufacturing; 36% retail and wholesale trade; 15% services; 18% construction; 3% 
Transportation/communication; and 1% finance/insurance (and about 7% all other industries, 
such as agriculture, mining, and real estate).  It follows that manufacturing, 
transportation/communication, and finance/insurance are overrepresented in our sample.   
 To further shed light on the nature of our sample firms as compared to the population 
of all Japanese firms, Figure 1 compares average ROA (a standard accounting measure of 
firm performance) between our sample firms and all Japanese firms over the sample period.  
The average ROA of all Japanese firms is calculated using Financial Statements Statistics of 
Corporations published every year by Japan Ministry of Finance.  Figure 1 shows that 
movement of ROA over the sample period is remarkably similar between our sample firms 
and the population of all firms in Japan although our sample firms have outperformed the 
population of all firms in Japan consistently throughout the period. 
 Finally, for listed firms, using Nikkei NEEDS database, we calculated average 
                                                        
12 The use of such propriety data is not an uncommon practice in the literature.  See, for example, 
Leonard (1990), Abowd (1990), Brunello, Eriksson (1999), Graziano and Parigi (2001), and Eriksson (2003). 
13 It was conducted every five years since 1981 and the 1996 census turns out to be the closest to the 
end year of our sample (1995).    
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annual shareholder return (ROR) over the sample period for our sample firms as well as for 
all listed firms in Japan.  Figure 2 shows both series.  Reassuringly movement of ROR over 
the sample period is again similar between our sample firms and the population of all listed 
firms.        
To study the performance sensitivity of Japanese CEO compensation, we begin with a 
standard executive compensation equation.14  That is,  
(1) ∆ln(APAY)it= f(PERFORMANCEit)    
where APAY=annual cash compensation of CEO of Firm i in Year t; and 
PERFORMANCEit=performance of Firm i in Year t.  ∆ln(APAY)it is annual rate of growth 
of APAY.  In short, Eq. (1) simply states that CEO’s annual pay growth depends on his/her 
firm’s performance.  For PERFORMANCEit, prior studies generally consider three types of 
measures: (i) accounting performance variables, such as changes in ROA (Return On Asset)  
and incidence of a negative profit; (ii) stock market performance variables, typically 
shareholder return; and (iii) sales growth.  In this paper, our data allow us to consider the 
following four variables: (i) DROAit (changes in ROA of Firm i from Year t-1 to Year t; (ii) 
NEGPROFit (=1 if Firm i’s pre-tax profit is negative in Year t, 0 otherwise); (iii) RORit 
(shareholder return of Firm i in Year t); and (iv) GSALESit (rate of growth of sales of Firm i 
from Year t-1 to Year t).  Since we can obtain stock market data for only listed firms, RORit 
is used only when we restrict our sample to listed firms.   
We begin with each performance variable individually and then consider all of them 
together.  That is, for all firms including both listed and unlisted firms, we estimate: 
(2)  ∆ln(APAY)it= α + βdDROAit + uit 
(3)  ∆ln(APAY)it= α + βnNEGPROFit + uit 
(4)  ∆ln(APAY)it= α + βgGSALESit + uit 
                                                        
14 See, for example, Murphy (1998). 
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(5)  ∆ln(APAY)it= α + βdDROAit + βnNEGPROFit + βgGSALESit + uit 
Our sample includes both listed and unlisted firms.  Conceivably the public nature of 
listed firms makes them more responsive to the interests of shareholders and hence makes 
their CEO compensation more sensitive to publicly observable profitability measures, such as 
ROR and ROA.15  To see if listed firms and unlisted firms differ in the way of paying their 
CEOs, we split our sample into the listed sample consisting of only listed firms and the 
unlisted sample consisting of only unlisted firms.  Furthermore, for listed firms, stock 
market data are readily available and therefore shareholder return (ROR) can be considered.  
Finally, all prior studies on Japanese executive compensation focus on listed firms.  
Obtaining separate estimates for listed firms and unlisted firms, we can provide the first 
econometric evidence on the determinants of executive compensation of unlisted firms in 
Japan whereas our listed firm estimates can be compared to those obtained by prior studies, 
all of which use aggregate data for listed firms.   
Specifically, for the unlisted sample, we re-estimate the same equations whereas for 
the listed sample, we add: 
(6)  ∆ln(APAY)it= α + βrRORit + uit; and 
replace Eq. (5) with: 
(7)  ∆ln(APAY)it= α + βdDROAit + βnNEGPROFit + βgGSALESit + βrRORit + uit 
APAYit is calculated by adding annual bonus to 12 times CEO’s monthly salary, and 
does not include non-cash compensation, such as stock options, deferred compensation and 
perquisites.  No micro data of Japanese CEO compensation (including the one used in this 
paper) provides information on such non-cash compensation.  However, the omission of 
these less visible forms of CEO compensation may not pose as serious a problem as in the 
case of the U.S.  Except for perquisites, over the time period under consideration, these 
                                                        
15 Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) test a similar hypothesis for a sample of Italian firms and find 
that pay-performance sensitivity is indeed higher in listed firms than in unlisted firms.   
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forms of compensation were probably not as wide-spread in Japan as in the U.S.16  Even if 
the considerable amount of these less visible forms of compensation are present, the neglect 
of these forms of compensation would not be a problem insofar as movements in these forms 
of compensation and cash compensation are correlated (Kaplan, 1994).   
We also estimate each equation with and without year effects to see if controlling for 
time-specific shocks that are common to all firms change the results.    
Finally, we repeat the same analysis using CEO’s monthly base salary MPAYit instead 
of his/her total annual cash compensation which includes both base salary and bonus.17  The 
Japanese bonus payment system has attracted considerable attention and controversy, in 
particular the debate between those who stress that the bonus system makes the Japanese 
payment system more sensitive to firm performance (especially profitability) and those who 
argue that bonus is simply a disguised regular wage and that it is introduced largely for tax 
advantages.18  We contribute to the debate by testing whether the Japanese bonus system 
makes CEO compensation more sensitive to firm performance.19  
 Descriptive statistics for key variables are summarized in Table 1, where all value 
variables are in 2000 yen.  Over the sample period of 1986-1995 the average CEO earned 28 
millions of yen a year and his/her monthly base salary was 2 millions of yen.  Listed firms 
tend to pay their CEOs more than unlisted firms (33 millions of yen vs. 26 millions of yen for 
APAY and 2.4 millions vs. 1.9 millions for MPAY).  The average annual pay increase of all 
CEOs was 480 thousands of yen in real terms over the sample period.  There appeared to be 
a large gap in the pay increase between listed and unlisted firms (950 thousands of yen vs. 
                                                        
16 See Kato (1997) for more details. 
17 We also repeated the same analysis using CEO’s annual bonus.  Unfortunately, we lost a 
significant number of observations with BONUS=0 (and therefore log of BONUS undefined), and our estimates 
turned out to be quite imprecise.   
18 For the debate, see for example Freeman and Weitzman (1987), Ohashi (1989), Hashimoto (1990), 
Brunello (1991), and Hart and Kawasaki (1999).   
19 Xu (1977) and Kubo (2001) use aggregate data on directors’ pay and test a similar hypothesis.  
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220 thousands of yen).  A similar pattern is observed for CEO’s monthly base salary 
increase as well.   
The average sales of our sample firms were 44 billions of yen and the average 
annual growth of sales (in real terms) was 3.5 percent.  As expected, sales were greater for 
listed firms than for unlisted firms (62 billions of yen vs. 30 billions of yen).  However, 
sales grew somewhat less rapidly for listed firms than for unlisted firms (3.2 vs. 3.7).  Our 
sample firms on average made a pre-tax profit of 1.9 billions of yen, and enjoyed ROA of 4.4 
percent.  Listed firms earned over six times more profit than unlisted firms whereas ROA is 
4.7 percent for listed firms and 4.2 percent for unlisted firms.  The average likelihood of 
making a negative profit was about 8 percent for all firms.  Listed firms are less likely to 
make a negative profit than unlisted firms (6.6 vs. 8.7).  The average employment level of 
our sample firms was a little over 700 employees.  Not surprisingly, on average listed firms 
employ more workers than unlisted firms (1355 vs. 368).  Finally, the data show a slight fall 
in ROA on average each year over the sample period (0.07 percentage-point fall).  List firms 
experienced a greater fall (0.19 percentage-point fall) whereas unlisted firms enjoyed a slight 
increase (0.007 percentage-point increase).  
      
VI. Results 
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates of Eq. (2)-Eq. (5) with and without year effects, 
using our full sample of firms including both listed and unlisted firms.  When only ROA (a 
standard accounting performance measure) is considered, the estimated coefficient on DROA 
is 1.415 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The positive and significant 
sensitivity of CEO’s annual cash compensation to ROA does not change even if we include 
the year dummy variables although the size of the pay-performance sensitivity falls 
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somewhat to 1.391.  It follows that a 1 percentage-point increase in ROA (say, 0.04 to 0.05) 
will lead to a 1.391-percent increase in CEO’s annual cash compensation.  Since the average 
CEO earns 28 millions of 2000-constant yen, improving ROA by 1 percentage point on 
average results in an increase in annual cash compensation of 0.38 millions of 2000-constant 
yen.   
 In Eq. (3) and Eq. (3)’, we test whether CEO’s annual cash compensation is sensitive 
to the presence of a negative profit.  Regardless of the presence of the year dummy variables, 
the estimated coefficients on NEGPROF are negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  The size of the estimates implies that CEO’s annual cash compensation will 
be reduced by 9 percent (or 2.5 millions of 2000-constant yen on average) if his/her firm 
makes a negative profit.   
 As Eq. (4) and Eq. (4)’ show, the estimated coefficient on GSALES is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level with the year dummy variables and at the 5 
percent with the year dummy variables.  It implies that a 1-percentage point increase in sales 
growth (say, from 0.03 to 0.04) leads to a modest 0.14 to 0.15 percent increase in CEO’s 
annual cash compensation (or an increase of 0.04 millions of 2000-constant yen on average).    
 Finally, Eq. (5) and Eq. (5)’ show the estimates on the performance sensitivity of 
CEO’s annual cash compensation when all performance variables are considered 
simultaneously.  ROA proves to have the most robust effect on CEO’s annual cash 
compensation.  The estimated coefficients on DROA continue to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level with and without the year dummy variables.  The size of the 
estimated coefficients is somewhat smaller than when only ROA is considered.  The 
presence of a negative profit turns out to be still negative and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level with and without the year dummy variable, and the size of its effect on CEO 
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annual cash compensation is a 6-percent fall instead of 9-percent fall.  Sales growth is no 
longer significant. 
 We now turn to our OLS estimates for two sub-samples: (i) the listed sample; and (ii) 
the unlisted sample.  Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of Eqs. (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) with 
and without the year dummy variables for the listed sample.  The estimated coefficients on 
DROA continue to be positive and significant at the 1 percent level with and without the year 
dummy variables as well as with and without other performance variables.  The estimated 
size of the performance sensitivity of CEO’s annual cash compensation is actually larger than 
in the case of the full sample.  The estimated coefficients on NEGPROF continues to be 
negative and statistically significant for all specifications.  The estimated coefficients on 
GSALES are still positive yet no longer statistically significant for all specifications.   
 For listed firms, stock market data are readily available.  We estimated the 
sensitivity of Japanese CEO’s annual cash compensation to shareholder return (ROR).  
When only ROR is considered, the estimated coefficient on ROR is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent level without the year dummy variables.  The size of the sensitivity of CEO’s 
annual cash compensation to shareholder return is 0.092.  This means that a 1-percentage 
point increase in shareholder return (say, from 0.05 to 0.06) will result in a 0.092 percent rise 
in CEO’s annual cash compensation (or an increase of about 0.03 millions of 2000-constant 
yen on average).  However, when the year dummy variables are included, the estimated 
coefficient on ROR falls to 0.07 and is not quite significant at the 10 percent level.  For the 
fully nested specification of Eq. (7) and Eq. (7)’, ROR is definitely insignificant at the 10 
percent level with and without the year dummy variables.20 
 Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of Eq. (2)-Eq. (5) with and without the year 
                                                        
20 Kaplan (1994) also finds in his regressions of the total salary and bonus earned by all directors on 
performance that ROR is not significant when all other performance variables are included.   
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dummy variables for the unlisted sample.  The estimated coefficients on DROA are again 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level with and without the year dummy variables as 
well as with and without other performance variables.  The estimated size of the 
performance sensitivity of CEO’s annual cash compensation of unlisted firms is smaller than 
that of listed firms, confirming our prior expectation.  On the other hand, annual cash 
compensation of CEOs of unlisted firms are just as sensitive to the presence of a negative 
profit as those of listed firms.  In stark contrast to CEOs of listed firms, however, for 
unlisted firms the estimated coefficients on GSALES are positive AND SIGNIFICANT at the 
1 percent level with and without the year dummy variables when only GSALES is considered.  
It appears that compared to listed firms, unlisted firms tend to reward their CEOs more for 
their sales growth and less for ROA.  Making a negative profit seems to be damaging for 
CEO compensation equally for both listed and unlisted firms. 
 Finally, we repeat the same analysis using CEO’s monthly base salary instead of 
their annual cash compensation which include both base salary and bonus.  The results are 
presented in Tables 5-7.  For all firms, comparing Table 5 to Table 2, we discern that ROA is 
still a significant determinant of CEO’s monthly base salary yet that the size of the effect of 
ROA is considerably smaller for monthly base salary than for total cash compensation.  In 
addition, CEO’s monthly base salary will be reduced as a result of a negative profit.  Yet 
again the impact of the negative profit is smaller for monthly base salary than for total annual 
cash compensation.  Sales growth is no longer significant with the year dummy variables 
even when other performance variables are excluded.  The size of the sales growth effect is 
also substantially smaller for monthly base salary than for total annual cash compensation.  
Overall, our estimates show that base salary is less sensitive to firm performance than total 
compensation including base salary and bonus, confirming that the Japanese bonus payment 
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system makes CEO pay more sensitive to firm performance.21  Contrast Tables 6 and 7 to 
Tables 3 and 4 respectively confirms that this overall finding is still valid when we study 
listed firms and unlisted firms separately. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has provided the first panel data estimates on the performance sensitivity 
of CEO’s cash compensation in Japan.  To do so, we have used unique 10-year panel data on 
individual CEO’s monthly base salary and total annual cash compensation (including both 
base salary and bonus) of 51 Japanese firms.  The most robust determinant of Japanese CEO 
compensation proves to be ROA (a standard accounting measure of firm profitability).  We 
have found a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation of ROA for all 
specifications (with and without the year dummy variables and with and without other 
performance variables).  The size of the estimated sensitivity of Japanese CEO’s annual cash 
compensation to ROA are between 1.3 and 1.4 for all firms.  It goes up when we consider 
only listed firms and goes down when considering only unlisted firms.  It is hard to compare 
the size of the estimated sensitivity of cash compensation to ROA that we obtained for Japan 
to prior estimates elsewhere due to heterogeneous data used by various prior studies.22  
However, our estimates appear to be in general agreement with prior estimates.23  At least 
our estimates do not support that Japanese corporate governance is unusually defunct with 
regard to the significance and size of the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting 
measures. 
                                                        
21 Our finding is consistent with earlier work using aggregate compensation data (e.g., Xu, 1977 and 
Kubo, 2001).    
22 Due to such data heterogeneity there are only a limited number of cross-national comparative studies 
of executive compensation, such as Kato and Rockel (1992a), Kaplan (1994), Abowd and Bognanno (1995), 
Conyon and Schwalbach (1997), Conyon and Murphy (1999), and Kubo (2001).     
23 For example, Rosen (1990) in reviewing various studies finds the estimated sensitivity of pay to 
accounting measures are in the 1.0 - 1.2 range.   
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 Since our sample includes a relatively small number of listed firms and data on 
shareholder return (stock market performance measure) are available only for listed firms, 
our estimated sensitivity of CEO compensation to shareholder return ought to be interpreted 
with caution.  That said, our study tends to support the general perception that Japanese 
CEO compensation is less sensitive to stock market performance.  Specifically, the 
estimated sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to shareholder return turns out to be less 
than 0.1 and statistically insignificant (except when the year dummy and all other 
performance variables are excluded).24  As such, our study lends support to some of the 
earlier studies using aggregate data (e.g., Kaplan, 1994) that point to the relatively weaker 
role played by stock market measures as compared to accounting performance measures in 
the determination of compensation for Japanese directors.  The evidence is largely 
consistent with the literature on Japanese corporate governance that tends to stress the role of 
the main bank and employees in the Japanese corporate governance system.     
 Finally, we find that the Japanese bonus system makes CEO compensation more 
sensitive to firm performance.  Insofar as CEOs are concerned, bonus does not appear to be 
a disguised base salary as the literature on the Japanese bonus system often suggests for 
regular employees.   
                                                        
24 Rosen (1990) finds the estimated sensitivity of pay to shareholder return is in the 0.10 - 0.15. 
  17
References 
Abowd, John, 1990, Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate 
Performance, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, s52-73.   
 
Abowd, John and M. Bognanno, 1995, International Differences in Executive and Managerial 
Compensation, in R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., Differences and Changes in Wage 
Structures, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 67-103. 
 
Abe, Yukiko, 1997, Chief Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in Japan, Journal of the 
Japanese and International Economies 11, 2-26. 
 
Ang, James S. and Richard L. Constand, 1997, Compensation and Performance: The Case of 
Japanese Managers and Directors, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 7, 
275-304. 
 
Ahmadjian, Christina, 2001, Changing Japanese Corporate Governance, Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business Working Paper No. 188, Columbia Business School. 
 
Aoki, Masahiko, 1988, Information, incentives, and bargaining in the Japanese economy 
(Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge). 
 
Aoki, Masahiko and Hugh Patrick, 1994, The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for 
Developing and Transforming Economies (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
 
Brunello, Giorgio, 1991, Bonuses, Wages and Performances in Japan: Evidence from Micro 
Data, Ricerche Economiche 45, 377-396.  
 
Brunello, Giorgio, Clara Graziano, and Bruno Parigi, 2001, Executive Compensation and 
Firm Performance in Italy, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 133-61.   
 
Conyon, M. and J. Schwalbach, 1997, European Differences in Executive Pay and Corporate 
Governance, Mimeo, Warwick Business School. 
 
Conyon, M. and K.J. Murphy, 1999, The Prince and the Pauper, Mimeo, Marshall School of 
Business, The University of Southern California.  
 
Eriksson, Tor, 1999, Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory, Journal of Labor 
Economics 17, 262-280. 
 
Eriksson, Tor, 2003, Managerial Pay and Executive Turnover in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Mimeo, Aarhus Business School.  
 
Freeman, Richard B. and Martin L. Weitzman, 1987, Bonuses and Employment in Japan, 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1, 168-194. 
 
Fukao, M. 1995, Financial Integration, Corporate Governance, and the Performance of 
Multinational Companies (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.). 
 
  18
Gibbons, Robert and Michael Waldman, 1999, Careers in Organizations: Theory and 
Evidence, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 3 (North Holland, Amsterdam) 2373-2437.    
 
Hart, Robert A. and Seiichi Kawasaki, 1999, Work and Pay in Japan (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge). 
 
Hashimoto, Masahori, 1990, The Japanese Labor Market in a Comparative Perspective with 
the United States: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation (Upjohn Institute, Kalamazoo). 
 
Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, 1990, The role of banks in reducing the costs of 
financial distress in Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 67-88. 
 
Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, 1991, Corporate structure, liquidity, and 
investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, 33-60. 
 
Joh, Sung Wook, 1999, Strategic Managerial Incentive Compensation in Japan: Relative 
Performance Evaluation and Product Market Collusion, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 81, 303-13. 
 
Kaplan, S., 1994, Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and 
the U.S., Journal of Political Economy 102, 510-546. 
 
Kaplan, S. and Bernadette A. Minton, 1994, Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: 
determinants and implications for managers, Journal of Financial Economics 36, 
225-58. 
 
Kato, Takao and Mark Rockel, 1992a, Experiences, credentials and compensation in the 
Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: evidence from new micro data, Journal 
of the Japanese and International Economies 6, 30-51. 
 
Kato, Takao and Mark Rockel, 1992b, The Importance of Company Breeding in the U.S. and 
Japanese Managerial Labor Markets: A Statistical Comparison, Japan and the World 
Economy 4, 39-45 
 
Kato, Takao. 1997, Chief Executive Compensation and Corporate Groups in Japan: New 
Evidence from Micro Data,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 
455-67. 
 
Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2001, The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and the U.K.: 
Agency Hypothesis or Joint Determination hypothesis?, CEI Working Paper Series, 
No. 2001-2, Hitotsubashi University.   
 
Leonard, Jonathan, 1999, Executive Pay and Firm Performance, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 43, s13-29. 
 




Montalvo, Jose G., and Yishay Yafeh, 1994, A microeconometric analysis of technology 
transfer: the case of licensing agreements of Japanese firms, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 12, 227-44. 
 
Morck, Randall and Masao, Nakamura, 1999, Banks and Corporate Control in Japan, Journal 
of Finance 54, 319-39. 
  
Murphy, Kevin, J., 1998, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card 
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3 (North Holland, Amsterdam) 
2485-2563. 
 
Nagaoka, Sadao, 2001, Determinants of the Introduction of Stock Options by Japanese Firms: 
Analysis from Incentive and Selection Perspectives, Mimeo, Institute of Innovation 
Research, Hitotsubashi University. 
 
Ohashi, Isao, 1989, On the Determinants of Bonuses and Basic Wages in Large Japanese 
Firms, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 3, 451-479. 
 
Romu Gyosei Kenkyu Jo, 1984, Rosei Jiho, No. 2718, 70-71. 
 
Romu Gyosei Kenkyu Jo, 1988, Rosei Jiho, No. 2905, 2-45. 
 
Rosen, Sherwin, 1990, Contracts and the Market For Executives, NBER Working Paper, No. 
3542, 1990. 
 
Sheard, Paul, 1989, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11, 399-422.  
 
Weinstein, David E., and Yishay Yafeh, 1995, Japan's Corporate Groups: Collusive or 
Competitive? An Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior, Journal of Industrial 
Economics 43, 359-76. 
 
Weinstein, David E., and Yishay Yafeh, 1998, On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial 
System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan, Journal of 
Finance 53, 635-72 
 
Xu, Peng, 1997, Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as 




Table1 Summary statistics 
 
All firms Listed firms Unlisted firms 
Variable 
 
Definitions Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
APAY 
CEO’s annual cash compensation in ten thousands of 
2000 yen 447 2832.071 1427.022 161 3312.668 1067.252 286 2561.525 1530.813
MPAY CEO’s monthly base salary in ten thousands of 2000 yen 453 206.1 101.9602 165 235.23 70.68172 288 189.411 112.918
DAPAY change in apay from Year t-1 to Year t 357 47.62945 515.7409 126 95.26443 370.8566 231 21.64674 578.823
DMPAY change in mpay from Year t-1 to Year t 367 3.878797 36.9768 132 6.309588 22.56335 235 2.513417 42.99249
SALES Sales in millions of 2000 yen 455 43507.17 51955.58 190 61793.56 55987.22 265 30396.17 44551.58
GSALES Rate of growth of sales from Year t-1 to Year t 406 0.034645 0.160541 171 0.031885 0.148427 235 0.036653 0.169096
PROFIT Pre-tax profit in millions of 2000 yen 446 1911.629 3894.631 181 3827.499 5330.026 265 603.0532 1400.793
ROA Return On Assets (profit/assets) 446 0.043735 0.045223 181 0.046875 0.033183 265 0.04159 0.051819
DROA change in roa from Year t-1 to Year t 397 -0.00073 0.029704 162 -0.00187 0.021827 235 0.0000656 0.034115
NEGPROF 1 if the firm’s profit is negative, 0 otherwise. 446 0.078475 0.26922 181 0.066298 0.249493 265 0.086793 0.282063
EMPLOYEE Number of employees 510 735.6078 1084.816 190 1354.842 1466.261 320 367.9375 489.8823
ROR Shareholder Return  162 0.049873 0.321382
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 18 listed and 33 unlisted firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
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Table 2 Determinants of CEO’s Annual Cash Compensation (All firms) 
Dependent variable=∆ln(APAY) 
 Eq. (2) Eq. (2)’ Eq. (3) Eq. (3)’ Eq. (4) Eq. (4)’ Eq. (5) Eq. (5)’ 
DROA 1.415 1.391     1.261 1.256 
 (0.235***) (0.238***)    (0.253***) (0.257***)
NEGPROF   -0.09 -0.09   -0.06 -0.06 
   (0.030***) (0.031***)   (0.030**) (0.030**)
GSALES     0.149 0.141 0.044 0.041 
     (0.052***) (0.056**) (0.064) (0.070) 
year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
_cons 0.006 0.041 0.011 0.043 0.001 0.042 0.010 0.043 
 (0.007) (0.023**) (0.008) (0.026**) (0.007) (0.024**) (0.008) (0.023**)
Obs. 303 303 308 308 311 311 303 303 
R2 0.1072 0.1346 0.0345 0.0613 0.0252 0.0502 0.1276 0.1508 
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 18 listed and 33 unlisted firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
***significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 3 Determinants of CEO’s Annual Cash Compensation (Listed firms) 
Dependent variable=∆ln(APAY) 
 Eq. (2) Eq. (2)’ Eq. (3) Eq. (3)’ Eq. (4) Eq. (4)’ Eq. (6) Eq. (6)’ Eq. (7) Eq. (7)’ 
DROA 2.150 1.633       1.880 1.452 
 (0.437***) (0.488***)       (0.449***)(0.494***)
NEGPROF   -0.10 -0.09     -0.07 -0.08 
   (0.041**) (0.041**)     (0.039*) (0.040*) 
GSALES     0.069 0.070   0.033 0.061 
     (0.066) (0.070)   (0.094) (0.113) 
ROR       0.092 0.070 0.041 0.022 
       (0.032***) (0.044) (0.033) (0.046) 
year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
_cons 0.011 -0.00 0.016 -0.01 0.010 0.015 0.004 -0.03 0.013 -0.01 
 (0.009) (0.033) (0.010) (0.034) (0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.032) 
Obs. 118 118 118 118 126 126 118 118 118 118 
R2 0.1721 0.2454 0.0503 0.2107 0.0089 0.1531 0.0637 0.1862 0.2210 0.2832 
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 18 listed firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
***significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level 
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 Table 4 Determinants of CEO’s Annual Cash Compensation (Unlisted firms) 
Dependent variable=∆ln(APAY) 
 Eq. (2) Eq. (2)’ Eq. (3) Eq. (3)’ Eq. (4) Eq. (4)’ Eq. (5) Eq. (5)’ 
DROA 1.240 1.317     1.077 1.115 
 (0.288***) (0.293***)    (0.323***) (0.335***)
NEGPROF   -0.09 -0.09   -0.06 -0.05 
   (0.041**) (0.043**)   (0.042) (0.043) 
GSALES     0.215 0.248 0.050 0.072 
     (0.078***) (0.084***) (0.088) (0.094) 
year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
_cons 0.002 0.054 0.008 0.047 -0.00 0.043 0.006 0.051 
 (0.010) (0.033) (0.011) (0.034) (0.011) (0.034) (0.011) (0.033) 
Obs. 185 185 190 190 185 185 185 185 
R2 0.0919 0.1358 0.0284 0.0608 0.0395 0.0812 0.1072 0.1481 
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 33 unlisted firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
Standard errors are in parentheses.     
***significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 5 Determinants of CEO’s Monthly Base Salary (All firms) 
Dependent variable=∆ln(MPAY) 
 Eq. (2) Eq. (2)’ Eq. (3) Eq. (3)’ Eq. (4) Eq. (4)’ Eq. (5) Eq. (5)’ 
DROA 0.917 0.867     0.836 0.837 
 (0.214***) (0.216***)    (0.231***) (0.234***)
NEGPROF   -0.06 -0.05   -0.04 -0.04 
   (0.025**) (0.026**)   (0.026**) (0.027) 
GSALES     0.092 0.072 0.013 -0.01 
     (0.047**) (0.050) (0.059) (0.063) 
year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
_cons 0.010 0.046 0.013 0.020 0.007 0.046 0.013 0.048 
 (0.006) (0.021**) (0.007**) (0.023) (0.006) (0.021**) (0.007**) (0.021**)
Obs. 313 313 318 318 321 321 313 313 
R2 0.0554 0.0867 0.0202 0.0517 0.0119 0.0411 0.0675 0.0947 
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 18 listed and 33 unlisted firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
***significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 6 Determinants of CEO’s Monthly Base Salary (Listed firms) 
Dependent variable=∆ln(MPAY) 
 Eq. (2) Eq. (2)’ Eq. (3) Eq. (3)’ Eq. (4) Eq. (4)’ Eq. (6) Eq. (6)’ Eq. (7) Eq. (7)’ 
DROA 1.643 1.294       1.494 1.169 
 (0.386***) (0.423***)       (0.402***)(0.431***)
NEGPROF   -0.07 -0.06     -0.06 -0.05 
   (0.036**) (0.036**)     (0.035*) (0.036) 
GSALES     0.046 0.040   0.003 -0.04 
     (0.057) (0.061)   (0.083) (0.097) 
ROR       0.060 0.064 0.021 0.039 
       (0.028**) (0.038**) (0.029) (0.040) 
year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
_cons 0.014 -0.01 0.017 -0.01 0.012 -0.01 0.009 0.002 0.016 0.019 
 (0.008**) (0.028) (0.009**) (0.028) (0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.029) (0.009*) (0.029) 
Obs. 124 124 124 124 132 132 124 124 124 124 
R2 0.1291 0.2182 0.0359 0.1781 0.0050 0.1422 0.0346 0.1742 0.1585 0.2432 
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 18 listed firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
Standard errors are in parentheses.    
***significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level 
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 Table 7 Determinants of CEO’s Monthly Base Salary (Unlisted firms) 
Dependent variable=∆ln(MPAY) 
 Eq. (2) Eq. (2)’ Eq. (3) Eq. (3)’ Eq. (4) Eq. (4)’ Eq. (5) Eq. (5)’ 
DROA 0.744 0.784     0.645 0.697 
 (0.266***) (0.271***)    (0.299**) (0.311**)  
NEGPROF   -0.05 -0.05   -0.04 -0.03 
   (0.034**) (0.036)   (0.036) (0.038) 
GSALES     0.129 0.133 0.026 0.023 
     (0.070**) (0.076**) (0.081) (0.088) 
year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
_cons 0.007 0.040 0.012 0.056 0.004 0.028 0.010 0.040 
 (0.009) (0.034) (0.010) (0.030**) (0.009) (0.035) (0.010) (0.035) 
Obs. 189 189 194 194 189 189 189 189 
R2 0.0452 0.1286 0.0199 0.0969 0.0228 0.1031 0.0637 0.1426 
Source: A private survey conducted annually since 1986 by a compensation consulting firm. 
Notes: The sample includes 33 unlisted firms from 1986-1995.  All variables are adjusted by CPI(FY2000=100).   
Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level. 
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